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THE TESTAMENTARY NATURE OF SETTLEMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE ELECTED
BY THE BENEFICIARY
Guy B.

HORTON*

INTRODUCTORY

Originally all life insurance was payable in one sum at death or
other maturity, but a decade or so ago the advantage of settlements
in the form of income became so well recognized that a large amount
of insurance is made so payable each year, chiefly in behalf of women
beneficiaries. The typical modes are these:
(x) The proceeds are retained and the interest is paid to the
beneficiary until her death, when the principal is paid to her estate or
to a named person.
The principal and the interest are paid in installments month(2)
ly, quarterly, semi-annually, or annually to the beneficiary for a
specified period, and if she dies before all are paid, the commuted
value of the remaining installments is paid to her estate or a named
person.
(3) The principal and the interest are paid in installments monthly,
quarterly, semi-annually, or annually to the beneficiary throughout
her life with a certain number guaranteed, and if she dies before all
the guaranteed installments are paid, the commuted value of those
remaining is paid to her estate or a named person.
In practice, these plans are combined and extended through several
lives so that the modes of payment which insurance companies actually undertake are very many.
In addition, nearly every modern policy gives the same elective
privilege to the beneficiary. Thus if the insured has not availed himself of the options and the policy becomes payable in one sum, the
beneficiary may leave the proceeds with the insurance company under
one of the typical settlements just described or under a combination
of them agreed on by her and the company. Similarly, the insured,
when the policy matures at endowment or he surrenders it for its
cash value, or an assignee, may select such a settlement in lieu of one
suM.
The optional settlements offered in the policy are for the sole benefit of the beneficiary, and rarely do they provide retention for longer
than her life or for payment of principal or remaining installments to
*Associated with the National Life Insurance Company, Montpelier, Vermont.
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anyone but her or her estate. But in practice the choice of settlements
goes much farther and through more than one life. The person
selecting tries to give the principal or the installments she may not
live to receive to someone else and perhaps to several persons successively. Not only income and periodic payments from principal
(which is the primary purpose of the settlement) are reserved, but,
because of that elemental human trait which makes one reluctant
to relinquish control while life lasts, the selecting party retains power
to withdraw part or all of the principal or to commute into one sum
the unpaid installments, as the case may be, or power to change the
person or persons who have been designated to receive the principal
or balance when the maker of the settlement dies; often more than one
is reserved.
To take a typical example of the simplest kind: The beneficiary
leaves the money with the insurance company which agrees to pay
the income to her as long as she lives and on her death to pay the
principal to some person she has named, with power reserved to
withdraw part or all of the principal or to designate a new payee of it.
The question created by this more extended choice may be stated
thus: What is the nature of the transaction when the option-taker
selects such a deferred settlement and directs that the principal or
unpaid part shall go to someone else after her death, but at the same
time retains some control over it?' Is this direction for payment of
the principal or the balance a testamentary act and invalid because
not done in accordance with the statute of wills, or is it proper and
enforceable? Tax statutes usually are broad enough to include situations which do not involve testamentary dispositions in the technical
sense, and in dealing with these courts exhibit a willingness to disregard technicality in favor of public policy in obtaining public
revenues.la Consequently, questions under them are not considered
in this discussion.
I
Like all attempts to give and retain at the same time, to eat one's
cake and have it too, uncertainty and trouble result.2 Has the giving
'It is possible that elective changes by a beneficiary in the mode of payment
during deferred settlements as arranged by the insured, may involve some of the
questions herein discussed, e. g., the insured provides that the beneficiary shall
have income for life with the option, say after a stated age, to select some other
mode of payment.
laRowley, Living Testamentary Dispositions (1929) 3 CINN. L. REv. 361, 39o.
2
"This is the ever recurring case of an attempt at once to give property and
keep it, and as long as men keep on trying to do that lawyers will not starve."
Dennison, J., in Griffith v. Sands, 84 Colo. 456,457,271 Pac. 191 (1928).
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become a gift, or has the retaining become a retention? In other
words, which element controls? On that depends the answer, roughly
speaking, to the question of validity op invalidity under the wills
acts. Has the right to the principal or commuted value so passed to
the designated person as to give that one a vested interest subject to
defeasance, or has he or she a mere expectancy of something, to become tangible only if and when the one arranging the settlement
dies without having exercised the reserved right? Is it a gift of a
present interest subject to revocation or withdrawal, or is it a present
gift of whatever may be left or available when the donor's death
occurs?a Is the transaction similar to a condition subsequent or is
it like a condition precedent? In the former, one gives with the
right to take back; in the latter case, one gives what he does not
dispose of before he dies. The distinction is very subtle and much
confusion results from failure of the courts to reason clearly upon it.
The distinction and its subtlety is not unlike that involved in cases
of death in common disaster where the resting of the burden of proof,
and conversely (in practical result) the right to the proceeds, depends
on whether an interest had actually passed to the beneficiary subject
to be divested, or whether the beneficiary had merely an expectancy
during the insured's life. The distinction between a disposition to
take effect only on the death of the donor, and one to take effect
immediately but subject to be revoked by the donor, may seem to be
formal rather than substantial, but it is important and has determinative effect on other problems.3 If the settlement turns out to be an

attempted testamentary disposition and so fails, the principal or commuted value of installments unpaid at death belongs to the settlor's
estate and is distributable to his heirs. This distribution may be
entirely different from that selected, and result in giving the fund to
4
those to whom the settlor did not wish to leave anything.
It is well at the outset to clarify our thought as to the nature,
testamentary or otherwise, of property dispositions, by reference to
several authorities-first Mr. Jarman:5
"A will is an instrument by which a person makes a disposition
of his property, to take effect after his decease, and which is in
its own nature ambulatory and revocable during his life. It is
this ambulatory quality which forms the characteristic of wills;
2aThe majority and minority opinions in Hanigan v. Wright, 233 App. Div.
82, 251 N. Y. Supp. 651 (3d Dept. 1931) divided on this point.
3
Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 521, 528.
4
Seftenberg, Border Lines of Agency, Living Trusts, and Testamentary Disposition (1930) 5 Wis. L. Rxv. 321.
6i JARMAN, WILLS (5th Am. ed. 1893) *z7.
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for, though a disposition by deed may postpone the possession
or enjoyment, or even the vesting, until the death of the disposing
party, yet the postponement is, in such case, produced by the
express terms, and does not result from the nature of the instrument. Thus, if a man, by deed, limit lands to the use of himself
for life, with remainder to the use of A. in fee, the effect upon
usufructuary enjoyment is precisely the same as if he should, by
his will, make an immediate devise of such lands to A. in fee;
and yet the case fully illustrates the distinction in question; for,
in the former instance, A., immediately on the execution of the
deed, becomes entitled to a remainder in fee, though it is not to
take effect in possession until the decease of the settlor, while, in
the latter, he would take no interest whatever until the decease
of the testator should have called the instrument into operation."
And next from a California court: 6
"The essential characteristic of an instrument testamentary
in its nature is, that it operates only upon and by reason of the
death of the maker. Up to that time it is ambulatory. By its
execution the maker has parted with no rights and divested
himself of no modicum of his estate, and per caitra no rights
have accrued to and no estate has vested in any other person.
The death of the maker establishes for the first time the character of the instrument. It at once ceases to be ambulatory, it
acquires a fixed status and operates as a conveyance of title. Its
admission to probate is merely a judicial declaration of that
status.
Upon the other hand, to the creation of a valid express trust it
is essential that some estate or interest should be conveyed to the
trustee, and when the instrument creating the trust is other than
a will, that estate or interest must pass immediately. (Perry on
Trusts, sec. 92.) By such a trust, therefore, something of the
settlor's estate has passed from him and into the trustee for the
benefit of the cestui, and this transfer of interest is a present one
and in nowise dependent upon the settlor's death. But it is
important to note the distinction between the interest transferred and the enjoyment of that interest. The enjoyment of the
cestui may be made to commence in the future and to depend for
its commencement upon the termination of an existing life or
lives or an intermediate estate."
Nothing can be clearer than the statement of the rules laid down by
the courts and text writers for determining the nature of the transaction, of which these are typical:
"The test.. .is whether the grantor intended the instrument
to be ambulatory, serving no purpose and having no effect until
GNichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 329, 330, 41 Pac. IO89, O91 (1895). Quoted
and approved in Tennant v. Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 14o Pac.
242 (1914); Sims v. Brown, 252 Mo. 58, I58 S. W. 624 (I913).

76
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after his death, and therefore revocable, or whether he intended
to convey thereby some present right or interest, absolute or
contingent, in the subject-matter of the grant, with the enjoyment thereof postponed until after his death. If, by the terms of
the instrument, the right or interest passes at once, subject to a
contingency over which the grantor has no control, it is a deed,
and irrevocable, even though the
7 enjoyment of the thing granted
is postponed until his death."
"The test is the time when the instrument was designed to take
effect. If it conveyed a present interest, though of a future
estate, the title vested. If, on the contrary, it was to take effect
only at the death of the maker of the instrument, it was testamentary in character, and could only operate as a will, if of any
force at all." 8
"If the instrument, whatever its form or the mode of its execution, passes a present interest which vests from the time of the

execution, it will be a deed, though the possession and the enjoyment of the estate granted in it do not accrue to the grantee until
a future time. On the other hand, if the instrument, though it is
in form a deed, does not convey any vested interest, right or estate
until the death of the person executing it, it will be regarded as
testamentary and revocable." 9
An instrument which purports to operate only on property which
belongs to the donor at his death shows his intention not to pass any
vested interest before his death; and is accordingly a will.' 0
These principles seem clear enough but as in many other fields and
problems, the difficulty occurs in applying the test." Courts differ in
their conclusion often on facts indistinguishable, though it must be
said that there is consistency in the decisions of a particular state. 2
o
,
7
Thomas v. Williams, io5 Minn. 88, 9 ,91 117 N. W. 155, I56 (igo8) citing
cases.
8
Hitchcock v. Simpkins, 99 Mich. 198,201, 58 N. W. 47,48 (1894); see Shaullv.
Shaull, 182 Iowa 770, 16o N. W. 36 (i916).
91 UNDERHILL, WILLS (1900) § 37.
ioPAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 64, citing cases, § 68. An interesting and important question exists in connection with life insurance trusts. In order to avoid
questions as to the effect of the trust on the rights of the insured and trustor to
deal with the insurance prior to its maturity, some life insurance and trust companies take the position that the trust does not come into existence, or more
accurately, that there is no trust res until the insured dies, and that the trustee
has no interest until that event. It seems fairly clear that the holders of that
theory have escaped Scylla only to fall on the Charybdis of a testamentary act.
""There are few, if any questions, less clearly defined in the law-books, than an
intelligible uniform test, by which to determine when a. given paper is a deed,
and when it is a will." Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110, 112, 5 So. 497, 498 (1889).
"Massachusetts appears to be an exception. It is impossible to reconcile
McEvoy v. Boston 5c Savings Bank, 201 Mass. So, 87 N. E. 465 (I909), and
Russell v. Webster, 213 Mass. 491, oo N. E. 637 (1913), with the prevailing
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The weight of authority is that the controlling factor is the intention
of the person arranging the settlement. 13 The intention of the grantor4
must be the pole-star in considering the charcter of the instrument.
If the maker intended an instrument which would take effect immediately, it is a deed.15 If it is not to take effect until the death of
6
the maker, it is testamentary.
We then reach the question: How is the maker's intention to be
ascertained? In Sharp v. H6ll,17 the court said: "Intention is an inferential fact, and, unless it is announced at the time the act is done, it
is not susceptible of direct proof." According to Crocker v. Smith, 5 it
is "to be collected from the terms of the instrument, considered in the
light of the surrounding circumstances." But this leaves us far from
the goal. How shall we determine the settlor's intent from the terms
of the instrument and surrounding circumstances? Perhaps we can
make some progress if we consider the elements which indicate the
intent. In the settlements we are discussing, the important elements
are his retention of the: (i) Right to income for a specified period, or
for his life; (2) Right to revoke the settlement and designate a new
beneficiary of the principal or unused part; and (3) Right to withdraw
part or all of the principal.
It appears to be settled that the retention of income does not make
the transaction testamentary and invalid. 9 The reservation of a life
interest does not change a deed of gift into a will.2 0 The test seems to
be whether any interest in the property itself has been retained, as
opinion in the state. So it was said in Smith v. Ossipee Valley Savings Bank, 64
N. H. 228, 232, 9 Atl. 792, 794 (x887): "Just what it is necessary to do to pass the
title to money through the intervention of a savings-bank the authorities do not
agree in the different states, and often in the same state, and it would be a difficult
task to reconcile them."
"Crocker v. Smith, 94 Ala. 295, 10 So. 258 (I89I); Innes v. Potter, i3o Minn.
320, 153 N. W. 604 (1915); see (1921) II A. L. R. 23, 41.
' 4Mays v. Burleson, i8o Ala. 396, 6I So. 75 (1913).
15Lippold v. Lippold, 112 Iowa 134, 83 N. W. 8o9 (igoo).
"McDaniel v. Johns, 45 Miss. 632 (1871).
17Supra note ii, at 115, 5 So. at 499.
ISupra note 13, at 297, 10 So. at 258.
"(1919) A. L. R. 902,9o6. Mays v. Burleson, supra note I4; Candee v. Conn.
Savings Bank, 81 Conn. 372, 71 At1. 551 (i9o8); Pyle v. East, 173 Iowa z65,
155 N. W. 283 (1915); Bone v. Holmes, I95 Mass. 495, 8I N. E. 290 (1907);
Chippendale v. North Adams Say. Bank, 222 Mass. 499, III N. E. 371 (1916);

Hallowell Say. Inst. v. Titcomb, 96 Me. 62, 51 Atl. 249 (igoi); Cazallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 1IO Atl. 359 (1920); In re Sides' Estate, ii9 Neb. 314, 228
N. W. 619 (1930); Smith v. Ossipee Valley Say. Bank, supre note 12; Burns v.
Nolette, 83 N. H. 489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929), 67 A. L. R. lO51 (193o).
2040 Cyc. 1091 (Wills).
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distinguished from the mere use or enjoyment. 21 In the case of real
property a residue of a life estate in a deed purporting to grant a fee
has been held to create a strong presumption that the deed was
intended to take effect immediately as a present conveyance of a
22
future estate, for otherwise the reservation would be useless.
The existence of the right to revoke the settlement and designate a
new beneficiary of the principal or unused part does not make the
settlement testamentary.? According to Jarman2 it indicates a
contrary intent:
"[T]]he insertion of such a clause, so far from indicating an intention to make a will, imparts quite a contrary color to the
transaction, as a will wants not an express power to render it
revocable."
2
The validity of such a reservation has been upheld in three cases. 6
In Tennant v. Tennant Memorial Home 7 the instrument conveyed
realty to a memorial home but reserved to the grantor the exclusive
possession and use of the rents and profits for her life, and continued:
"further reserving to her, the said grantor, the right to revoke the
deed as to the said property," and the right during her life to sell any
of it and execute deeds thereof in her individual name and convey
absolute title to the purchaser, and to use the proceeds arising from
such sale to her own use without any liability for her or her estate to
account therefor. It was held that the instrument was not testamentary in character, but was a present conveyance of a future
interest. The provision that the deed may be recalled does not make
28
the instrument ambulatory so long as not exercised.
21(1919)

3 A. L. R. 902,

906,

citing Tucker v. Tucker, 138 Iowa 344, xI6 N. W.

19 (i908); Jones v. Nicholas, I51
22(1921) II A. L. R. 23, 55, 58.

Iowa 362,

I30 N.

W.

125 (1911).

22
See ibid. 78, 99. This was not so as to real property under ancient common
law, but the reason therefore has long since failed and the rule with it.
20p.cit. supra note 5, at *22.
2
Quoted and approved in Hall v. Burkham, 59 Ala. 349, 355 (1877).
2
6Mays v. Burleson, supra note 14; Tennant v. Tennant Memorial Home, supra
note 6; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, II4 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E. 373 (1926).

27Supra note 6.
28

Lippold v. Lippold, supra note 15. Beaumont's Estate, 214 Pa. 445, 63 Atl.
(19o6) appears to be contra. There the trust was to use income to pay
premiums on a certain insurance policy and pay proceeds and accumulation to
named beneficiaries, and the right to revoke was reserved. The court held it to be
a mere power of attorney revoked by clause in the insured's will. This case was
distinguished in Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Klemr, 12 D. & C. (Pa. 1928), where
duties were imposed on the trustee; and in In re Eisenlohr's Estate, 258 Pa. 341,
io2 Atl. 117 (1917), where a consideration for the transaction existed.
1o23
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Power to withdraw part or all the principal 9 or to sell and dispose
of the property 0 does not make the transaction testamentary. In
Hackett v. Moxley31 the court held on authority of Blanchard v.
Sheldon3 2 that a gift of a note was not nullified by reservation of the
right to use such portions of the avails as the donor might require
during her life.
The fact that the fund will not be received until the donor's death
is not conclusive. "It is as competent for one to make the event in
the future upon the happening of which the estate is to come into
possession, and the trust is to be executed, the death of the donor, as
any other event. The fact, in such case, that the event named is
death, rather than some other selected event, is not at all determinative of the quality or legal character of the trust. It is a mere time
when the trust, completely and perfectly constituted theretofore, is,
as to the estate already thus vested in interest by it in the trustee, for
the beneficiaries, to come into possession-to be enjoyed. "n Similarly, an assignment of an insurance policy passes a present interest
although payment to the beneficiary will not be made until the
assignor's death. An assignment of a non-negotiable note may be
good although it may not be due until a future day.34 A note based on

consideration is not testamentary simply because payment is postponed until death.' That a bond or agreement provides for renewal
of notes from year to year, to be payable after the maker's death,
does not necessarily make the instrument testamentary. It is a
debitum in praesentisolvendum infuuro.6 A valid gift may be in the
way of a forgiveness or a release of a debt due from donee to donor 3 7
Or, of so much of a debt as is not collected before the donor's death.
The title to the gift passed, subject to defeasance which terminated at
the payee's death. This is not -testamentary.38
29
Burns
0

v. Nolette, supra note i9; Dunn v. Houghton, 51 Atl. 71 (N. J. 19o2).
3 Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368, I45 S. E. 661 (1928). But see Roth v. Michalis,
125 Ill.
325, 17 N. E. 8o9 (1888); Mould v. Robin, 257 Ill.
436, ioo N. E. 971
(1913).
2165 Vt. 71, 25 Atl. 898 (1892).
2243 Vt. 512 (x871).
3Hiserodt v. Hamlett, 74 Miss. 37, 43, 20 So. 143, r44 (896).
31Southern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Durdin, 132 Ga. 495, 64 S. E. 264 (1909).
On the other hand a lease providing that rents accruing after the death of the
lessor should be paid to his wife was held invalid as testamentary. Murray v.
Cazier, 23 Ind. App. 600, 53 N. E. 476 (1899). The fact that rents are chattels
real appears to have been decisive. The court hinted that if there had been a
note payable to husband and wife, the result might have been otherwise.
3

'Gostina v. Whitham, 348 Wash. 72, 268 Pac. 132 (3928).
37
36_n re Eisenlohr's Estate, supra note 28.
Pyle v. East, supra note 39.
38

Bedford's Exr. v. Chandler, 81 Vt. 270, 69 Atl. 874 (z9o6); Compton v.

Westerman, I50 Wash. 391, 273 Pac. 524 (1928).
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In a few cases, however, the court has looked at the transaction as a
gift of what might be left at the donor's death and held it testamentary and invalid. 9 So, a deed to a trustee "to take effect only upon
the death of N," one of the trustors, of all property "we may have
and own at the time of the death of N" was testamentary. 40 A New
York case4' holds the opposite. A fund was deposited in a bank in
trust for the depositor's granddaughter, subject to the limitation
that the depositor might use so much of the fund as she desired. The
bank book was handed to the donee but subsequently was redelivered
to the donor so that she might withdraw funds for her support and
care during illness, the donee living some distance away. The court
held that the corpus was not necessarily the full amount of the
deposit, but was the balance, and that the gift of the latter was irrevocableA' In Ricker v. Brown,4 a deed by a man to his housekeeper of
"all the residue of my property, real or personal, not otherwise assigned to her, which may be remaining in my name and ownership at
my death" was held good as a covenant to stand seised of real estate
belonging to him at the time of execution of the deed, subject to a
power to dispose of the property during his life. The deed was not
testamentary as it took effect at the time of its execution.
On the other hand, inthe Rhode Island case of Slineyv. Cormier4 B,
a wife, loaned a sum of money to C for a fixed term, the agreement
providing that repayment was to be made to B, if living when the
debt became due, otherwise to A, her husband, if he were then living,
otherwise to D, a niece of A and B. At the due date of the loan A and
B were dead. C refused to pay "Dwho thereupon brought suit. The
"9 Norway Say. Bank v. Merriam, 88 Me. 146, 33 Atl. 84o (1895); Sherman v.
Bank, 138 Mass. 581 (1885); see Cazallis v. Ingraham, supra note i9.
40

Nicolls v. Nicolls, 168 Cal. 444, 143 Pac.

CALIF. L. REV. 256

712

(I914).

A note in (1915) 3

says the result might have been different if the clause had

been, "that we now have, and that we may have..." Professor Scott, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 523, suggests that the ineffectiveness results from non-existence, or at
least lack of indentification, of the subject matter of the trust during the trustor's
life. See (1921) 11 A. L. R. 23, 96. The following cases held the fact to be evidence of no present transfer of interest: Mould v. Rohm, supra note 3o; Salzwedel's Estate, 17i Wis. 441, 177 N. W. 586 (1920).
4
Hanigan v. Wright, supra note 2a.
42This was so held notwithstanding a further and rather extreme feature. After
her repossession of the bank book, the donor withdrew $ioo and later, just prior to
her death, drew an order for the balance which with the bank book she forwarded
to the bank. A check for this balance was sent to the donor and the account
closed, but she was not able to endorse the check when it arrived, and soon died.
A minority of the court held that though the proceeds remained in the bank, they
did not remain in the trust.
43I83 Mass. 424, 67 N. E. 353 (1903).
4 4 9 R. I. 74, 139 Atl. 665 (1928).
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court held that as B retained control of the debt, D did not obtain
title thereto until death of A and B, and the gift was testamentary.
In Hunt v. Hunt45 the decedent indorsed on the back of a note these
words: "If I am not living at the time this note is paid, I order the
contents to be paid to [A. H.]" He died before the note was paid.
This also was held to be a testamentary disposition.
New Jersey appears to hold an extreme position. Its leading case is
Stevenson v. Earl.46 The Pennsylvania Railroad Company had
established an employees' savings fund. One of the rules was that
depositors must state in writing the name of the person to whom the
fund was to be paid on the death of depositor, and another provided
that on the depositor's death the fund should be paid over to such
designated person. A depositor could withdraw at his pleasure all or
any part of the fund, however, and considerable withdrawals were
made in the present instance. He gave the passbook to his wife, who
had been named as beneficiary, with a statement that "here was the
money" and that if he died it should go to her. The court held, that
in addition to a donative intention, there must be a complete stripping of the donor of all control over the thing given, and that this was
the crucial test. Therefore, the attempted disposition was testamentary and the fund belonged to the donor's estate. The opinion
concludes with a statement that to hold such a method of disposing
of one's property at death to be valid, would practically repeal the
statute of wills. 47 This conclusion and its vehement denunciation of
such attempts to avoid the statute of wills was followed in Trenton
Savings Fund v. Wytham.48 By its charter this savings society was
given power to keep a book in which a depositor might name some
person to whom any balance on depositor's death should be paid.
The court of chancery held that a depositor's designation under the
rule was, as had been held in Stevenson v. Earl, a gift merely of what
was left when the donor died, and testamentary. In another New
Jersey case,49 two friends executed an agreement that a described safe
and its contents should on the death of one become the property of
N. H. 434 (1828).
4665 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 Atl. 1o9i (1903).
Stevenson v. Earl seems to be in the bank deposit class. See (1929) 38 YALE
L. J. 1135, I39, n. 17. A notein (1930) 28 Mica. L. REv. 603, 6o8, says: "If this
decision is correct it would appear to make the proceeds of a life insurance policy
in which the insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary, a testamentary disposition. In what way did the depositor have any more control
over the fund than the insured had over such a paid up policy?"
48Io4 N.J. Eq. 271, 145 Atl. 462 (1929). The reversal of this case by the Court
of Errors and Appeals, io6 N. J. Eq. 93, 148 Atl. 622 (I93O), was on the relative
effects of a general and special statute, and did not affect the point discussed here.
4U. S. Trust Co. v. Giveans, 97 N. J. L. 265, 117 Atl. 46 (1922).
454

47
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the other. The court held this an attempt to dispose of property
after death which could not be done except by will.
New Jersey has still more recently dealt with the question. In In re
Koss' Estate,5" decedent was an employee of the Standard Oil Company of New York. That company had inaugurated a stock-purchase
plan and contributed to it 50% of the amount paid by the employee.
The stock was to be held by trustees for five years, but if an employee
left the service of the company or chose to withdraw from the plan
he would receive only the cash he paid in and interest. In case of
death, the cash and stock would be paid to the person designated by
the employee. No assignment of employee's rights or interest in the
plan or in the stock, etc., was allowed. Koss, the employee, had
designated a person to take upon his death. The lower court held
that there was no donative interest of a present gift; and that the
designation was testamentary and invalid. 51 This was reversed on
appeal,52 the court holding that the designation of a beneficiary to
receive stock at the death of its owner was the mere naming of a
person for whose benefit the contract is made. The reversal was on a
point which illuminates the distinction between deferred settlements
of insurance arranged for by the policyholder, and the same mode of
income payment when selected by the beneficiary after the policyholder's death. The latter deals with specific property which belongs
to her, the beneficiary, but there is no specific property to which the
insured in his lifetime is entitled. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
concurs with the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals on exactly
the same facts, the corporation being the Standard Oil Company of
Kentucky." The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held a similar
transaction testamentary but without citation of authorities or careful analysis. 4
A custom, recently grown up, in connection with payment in advance of premiums on insurance policies, appears to present a new
phase of the general problem. The policyholder deposits a sum of
money with the insurance company to be held at interest and the fund
501o5 N. j.Eq. 29, 146 Atl. 471 (1929).
5*Professor Scott, op. cit. supra note 3,at 537, criticizes this holding as inconsistent with life insurance law. The transaction did not differ from that employed in naming a beneficiary of a life policy when the right to change the beneficiary had been reserved. This discussion by Professor Scott is cited by the
higher court as potent authority for its conclusion.
52io6 N. J.Eq. 323, 55o Atl. 36o (1930), a 7 to 6 decision. See 79 U. of PA.
L. REV. 237 (5930).
53Siter v. Hall, 200 Ky. 43, 294 S.W. 767 (1927).
5Tensfield v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 134 Okla. 38, 272 Pac. 404 (1928),
criticized in (1929) i Rocxv MT. L. REv. 156.
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used to pay the premiums on a particular policy as they become due.
Often the depositor directs the insurance company to pay any balance
of the deposit at his death to a named person, generally the person
who receives the proceeds of the policy. Quaere: Is the gift of what
may be left testamentary? It probably is if subject to depositor's
control during life; otherwise, not.
The suggestion that the designated person is to be treated as a
contract beneficiary has been taken up by other courts than those of
New Jersey. For instance, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
said. 5 "It was a pure contractual relation and no question of gift or
trust arises in determining the rights of the parties under such a
contract." A similar court in West Virginia upheld the right of
survivorship in a deposit "payable to the order of either, or the
survivor," not on the theory of a valid gift inter vivos, but by virtue
of the contract of deposit." In a Massachusetts case a deposit was
to be paid to the depositor and sister (Mrs. 1) or either of them as
they should call for the deposit or a part of it, and the balance (not
withdrawn during their joint lives) was to be paid to the survivor of
them. The court said: "in such case there is no gift of the balance on
the death of [depositor]. [Mrs. W, when she survived depositor]
became the owner of the balance undrawn by virtue of the contract
of deposit, and not by virtue of a gift which took effect on [depositor's] death.1 57 In Perryv. Levoroni the deposit was made in the name
of the depositor and his wife and payable to either or the survivor.
Both signed and delivered to the bank the usual identification cards.
The court held:' s
"Upon these facts there was no gift during [depositor's] lifetime and no gift of the balance upon his death. There was, however, a completed contract between the depositor and the bank,
assented to by [the wife], by which, upon the death of her husband she became the owner of the balance of the deposit...
[b]y the terms of the contract [and] the balance belonged to her
as the survivor."
5Deal's Admr. v. Merchants and Mechanics Say. Bank, 120 Va. 297,
S. E. I35 (1917) (the deposit was to the credit of the owner or another).
5'Wisner v. Wisner, 82 W. Va. 9,95 S. E. 802 (1918).
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67Chippendale v. North Adams Say. Bank, supra note 19, at 5o2, III N. E. at

3735'252 Mass. 390, 393, 147 N. E. 826, 827 (1925). See the dissenting opinion in
Rice v. Bennington County Say. Bank, 93 Vt. 493, io8 Atl. 708 (1920). It is
suggested in a note in (1927) 48 A. L. R. 189, 204,2o6, that all the Massachusetts
court meant was that the contract took the place of delivery. But see Sullivan v.
Sullivan, x6x N. Y. 554, 56 N. E. I16 (igoo), which repudiates'both contract
and trust theory. This was a certificate of deposit.
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An interesting and illuminating discussion of this aspect of the generalproblem appears ina casein the court of chancery of New Jersey.5 9
A lady (A) took her niece (B) to a savings bank and caused an account
then standing in her (A's) name to be transferred so as to be payable
to A or B. Both signed the depositor's book. The intent of A was
that she should control the deposit during her life and that B should
have what might be left of it after A's death. The court held that the
act vested a complete contract right in B which B could use to obtain
the money, and that this was not affected by the fact that the donor
had power to withdraw the entire sum and make the gift of no value
to B. The theory is well stated in a recent case-." "[U pon deposit
of an account the bank is constituted a debtor, and when the depositor
orders the bank to pay himself or another upon order of either party,
notifies the second party of the completed transaction and secures her
signature evidencing assent to the arrangement, he has created in the
second party by contract a joint interest in his right to the deposit
equal to his own."
It must be remembered, however, that of all objects of gift, bank
deposits are subject to most severe and strict rules because it is well
known that persons make deposits in unusual ways, or to the credit
of real or fictitious persons, with no intention of divesting themselves
of ownership. No such condition or reason for extreme measures
exist in the insurance settlements which we are considering. It,
therefore, may be assumed that less evidence of a transfer in praesenti
is needed. Furthermore, the existence of the usual requirement that
the bank book be presented for any withdrawal is an important
factor in the deposit decisions on the question of delivery. This may
distinguish many of them from the cases which involve purely
insurance situations.
The Court of Claims of the United States has had to deal with
another phase of our inquiry.61 The plaintiff as executrix of the estate
of W sued to recover from the United States money represented by
certain treasury savings certificates payable in case of the death of the
owner (W) to beneficiaries named therein who had been so designated
by W. The statute providing for this issue of securities authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe the terms and conditions of
registration and payment. Pursuant to rules promulgated by him,
the certificate named a payee in the event of the original owner's
5"Dunn v. Houghton, supra note 29.
' 0Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, supra note 26, at 253, 15x N. E. at 377.
"lWarren v. United States, 66 Ct. C1. 634, 638, 639 (1929), certiorari to the U. S.
Supreme Court denied, 281 U. S. 739, 5o Sup. Ct. 346 (193o).
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death. The executrix claimed the proceeds as part of W's estate on
the ground that the certificates were the property of W during his
life, had never been delivered to the beneficiaries directly or constructively, and that the treasury department did not have power
to make rules affecting the passing of title to property in the state
where W was domiciled-that the passing of title should be governed
by the laws of that state. The court confirmed the right of the
beneficiary named in the certificate to its proceeds, saying:
"At the outset it is well to note that this is a suit on a contract
between the plaintiff's testator and the United States. This
contract was entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury as
the representative of the defendant under authority of the act of
Congress and in conformity to the regulations made and promulgated by him before the execution of the contiact, under authority given him by said statute, and the statute was passed in the
exercise of the constitutional powers of Congress to borrow
money. The contract having been entered into in conformity
to the act and under the authorized regulations previously made
and promulgated, both the act and the regulations must be read
into the contract, became a part thereof at the time the contract
was executed, and limit and fix the rights of the plaintiff's
testator as the purchaser of the certificates... [T]he case is
simply one of contract, a part of which contract is the act of
Congress previously passed and the regulations of the Secretary
of the Treasury promulgated in conformity thereto."
This concise and positive statement of the bank deposit and similar
cases just discussed must not be taken as authority against the possible trust nature of transactions which involve very similar facts.
The relation of depositor and bank is contractual, of course. The
entire transaction arranged for may be something more than the
contractual and the donee have equitable interests. An agreement
often is the basis of a trust. In a contest between depositors and
bank, the depositors, even the one other than the original owner, can
properly stand on the contractual relation created by the deposit.
The bank itself, if it has paid the fund to the one other than the
original owner on his designation, can defend against the original
owner on the ground that it had complied with its contract in making
that payment. But the real contest usually is between the donee
and the estate of the donor, with the bank or the insurance company
a mere stakeholder. In the insurance cases involving matured policies, the fund belonged to the beneficiary, to the assignee, or, in case
of endowment or cash value on surrender, to the insured. If a succeeding beneficiary becomes entitled to an interest, say the principal
at death of the settlor, the property must have passed somehow to her
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from the settlor. Since there is no valuable consideration for this
transfer, it usually is said that her right to the fund must rest on a
gift, trust, or bequest, and the last obviously is not the fact.
In other instances of analogous nature the courts have denied
testamentary character. The legality of stock-purchase agreements
whereby the survivors shall have the right to purchase the stock of a
deceased stockholder has been upheld as against the contention that
it was an attempted testamentary disposition, in Illinois,6 ' New
York,13 and North Carolina." Likewise the right of partners to enter
into similar agreements for purchase by the others of the share of the
one first to die has been upheld in Massachusetts, 5 New York,66 Pennsylvania,67 and by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.68 On
the other hand such contracts have been held testamentary and
invalid in Mississippi6 9 and Rhode Island)' 0 Alabama is sometimes
cited in this class but the transaction litigated in that state involved
other features.7 1 In Illinois7 ' such a contract was overthrown but not
for its testamentary nature. The sale price was hopelessly inadequate,
$5,060 for property worth $70,000.

In these cases, the consideration for the stock or the partnership
interest went to the estate of the seller-the deceased. The situation
is radically different and the result perhaps testamentary, if, as now
often attempted, the deceased stockholder or partner provides in the
purchase agreement that the consideration or purchase price paid
by the survivors shall go to a named person or persons, often to be
held and paid by a trustee in a complicated manner over many years.
This obviously imposes a testamentary settlement on the stock purchase or partnership liquidation transaction.
6

2Owings v. Lehman, 19 o Ill. App. 432 (1914); Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, x16 N. E. 648 (1917) (conferring an irrevocable proxy to vote
stock after the owner's death).
3
6 1n re Cory's Estate, 177 App. Div. 871, 164 N. Y. Supp. 956 (ist Dept. 1917);
In re Fieux, 241 N. Y. 277, 149 N. E. 857 (1925).
"Faucett v. Faucett, x91 N. C. 679, 132 S. E. 796 (1926).
45Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, io4 N. E. 466 (1914).
66
Matter of Columbia Trust Co., 169 App. Div. 822, 155 N. Y. Supp. 676 (Ist
Dept. 1915); Matter of Orvis, 179 App. Div. 1, 166 N. Y. Supp. 126 (ist Dept.
1917); In re Mildrum's Estate, 108 Misc. 114, 177 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Surr. Ct.
1919).
467In re Eisenlohr's Estate, supra note 28.
SMcKinnon v. McKinnon, 56 Fed. 409 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893).
GOThomas v. Byrd, ii Miss. 692, 73 So. 725 (1916).
70Ferrara v. Russo, 4o R. I. 533, 102 Atl. 86 (1917). Stated to be "utterly
unjust and seemingly unjustified" in (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 542, 544nGomez v. Higgins, 13o Ala. 493, 30 So. 417 (19o).
72Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920).
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There is thus considerable authority in various fields for the
technique of holding that the beneficiary's rights rest upon a contract
basis, which will preserve them, rather than on a testamentary basis
which will destroy them. Virginia, West Virginia, Massachusetts,
and Ohio hold that the delivery which must accompany an ordinary
gift is rendered unnecessary by the contract by which the bank becomes obligated to both depositor and donee of joint-deposits. Why
is there not the same effect when the donee succeeds the depositor,
e.g., takes the principal on depositor's death? If the depositary's
contract suffices when the payees exist as a pair, why can it not have
the same effect when the parties are arranged tandem? While the
contract theory always has been a minority one and even in Massachusetts has been reduced to a feature of the gift rendering delivery
unnecessary in joint-deposit cases, it is submitted that it has value
in the special problem we are discussing.
A great deal of the difficulty exists because of failure to recognize
the distinction between (i) a donative transfer of property by the
procurement of a contract the performance of which may benefit the
donee, and (2) a donative transfer of a contract, already existing
between a third party and the donor, by the donor's delivery of the
evidence of the contract to the donee.73 The former is illustrated by
life insurance. One may accomplish a donative transfer of a large
portion of his estate to a beneficiary by procuring a life policy payable
to such beneficiary. Incidentally, it may be observed that the whole
beneficial enjoyment of the gift is necessarily postponed until the
death of the donor, and that the validity of the donative transfer is
not affected by power reserved in the policy to extinguish the liability
of the insurance company, and therefore all benefit to the donee, by
surrendering the policy or changing the beneficiary. The latter case
referred to is illustrated by a gift of the benefits of an existing life
policy, payable to the donor, by the method of his delivering the
policy to the donee with an essential donative purpose.7 4 Delivery
is essential in this method; it is not essential when the gift is made by
naming the beneficiary in the contract.
The fact that an ordinary promissory note is made payable at or
after the maker's death does not affect its validity nor give it testamentary character. However, an instrument disposing of certain
notes or their proceeds after the death of the person making them, is
testamentary in nature and inoperative unless executed as a will.71
73

Dunn v. Houghton, supra note 29.
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Grant, 54 N. J. Eq. 208, 23 Atl. io6o (1896);
Dunn v. Houghton, supra note 29.
764o Cyc. io89 (Wills).
74
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One may purchase an annuity payable to himself for life and then to a
donee for life and reserve the power to deprive the donee of all
benefit.78 Or the same general result may be reached in the case of a
beneficiary's disposal of the proceeds of a policy.
Assume that two persons, A and B, are each entitled as beneficiaries
to one-half the proceeds of a policy matured by death. A may return
the company's check for his portion and request that it be paid in
installments for a stated term or for life and any balance on his death
be paid to C, reserving the power to designate another recipient of
the balance. B may request that his portion be retained and the income paid him for life and on his death the principal be paid to D,
reserving the power to withdraw the entire principal at any time.
The first settlement is an annuity, with automatic periodic withdrawals of principal. The withdrawal in the second is optional with
the settlor, but it exists just the same in the first. The only difference is that the option in this case was exercised in advance, and in
the other, at a later time. One should not have greater testamentary
effect than the other.
'So far, we have been considering the settlement to be a gift and the
right given to be legal, that is, the relation is entirely debtor and
creditor, or contractual. The insurance company with which the
proceeds of life insurance are left is in the position of promising to
pay, for example, the income to the settlor and the principal to the
person named by him. The likeness of the transaction is to deposits
in a bank. But ordinary deposits in banks are for the depositor solely.
Here we have a settlement for the benefit of others in addition to the
settlor and often those others will derive more benefit than the settlor; sometimes the entire benefit, present and future, goes to others.
The insurance company invests the fund and pays such part of the
income as it believes safe, not less than a guaranteed percentage.
These differences in the fact situation have caused courts to use
trust phraseology in discussing deposits in banks when they are made
for the benefit of others. A casual examination of bank deposit cases
will reveal its frequency. More often than one expects, they are held
to be trusts. Thus a trust is created where one having a deposit in a
savings bank stated to its teller that she wanted it so that either of
her two sisters could, in the event of her death, draw the money
without probate proceedings, and thereupon gave an order to the
bank to pay to either of them or herself, and furnished their signa7$Dunn v. Houghton, supra note
(1883).

29.

See Murray v. Flavell,
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tures, and the bank added their names to the passbook, and in like
77
manner changed the account in the ledger.

If A deposits money in B's name, to his credit, intending it as a
present gift, but to remain in the bank during the lives of A and his
wife, and that of the survivor, subject to the income being taken by
them, the bank takes the money on the trust to hold it for the term,
pay the income to A and wife or the survivor, during the term, and
at the close pay the principal sum to B; and when B is notified of the
gift, and accepts it with its burdens and conditions, a title to the principal is perfected in him, subject to the equitable right of A and wife
to take the income. A's title and possession, and all right to a title
or the possession of the principal, is as entirely divested at the
moment of the acceptance as if it were to be paid by the bank to B
on demand. It is an executed perfected gift as to A. He has delivered
the money to the bank. His dominion and power to revoke are gone.
His situation is not dissimilar to what it would have been had he given
the money accompanied by an unqualified delivery to B vesting the
title and possession in him on B's undertaking to account to A for
the income he might receive from it during the term; the important
difference being that the payment of the income to A and wife is
secured and made through a trustee-practically, at least, the safer
way.

78

There is greater importance than first appears in this question as to
the nature of the relation, i.e., whether equitable or otherwise. The
alternate theory of the settlement as a gift of a legal entity is subject
to the weakness that delivery or other act necessary to create a present interest in the donee is not always found, or is found only in some
fictitious manner. On the other hand, it is well established that the
declarant of the trust need not notify the cestui que trust. Neither
knowledge on the part of the cestui, nor acceptance of the trust by
him, is necessary to the complete creation of a trust. 79 The creation

of a trust is but a gift of the equitable interest. An unequivocal declaration of gift as effectually passes the equitable title to the cestui que
trust as delivery passes the legal title to the donee of the gift inter
vivos. One may constitute himself trustee by mere declaration.8 0
A gift must be executed by delivery; but a trust may be by declaration.8 ' The declaration bears the same relationship to an equitable
"7Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370 (i898; Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Scobie, supra note 26.
78
Smith v. Ossipee Valley Say. Bank, supra note i9.
79
Bogert, Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (1916) I CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 159.
"0Hallowell Sav. Institute v. Titcomb, supra note 19.
"'Bath Sav. Institute v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122, 33 AtI. 836 (1895).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
gift that delivery bears to a legal gift.8 2 If it be true that to perfect a
trust, it must be accepted, acceptance is presumed in case of beneficial trust;"' and the acceptance may be after the donor's death s4 By
the intervention of a trustee, even a donatio mortis causa may be effected, 5 although the deed does not come to the knowledge of the
donee and is not accepted by him until after the death of the donor- 6
Illustrations of these doctrines are many. In a Missouri case8 7 a
settlement was in writing as follows:
"I... give to [naming the donees] the following described notes
and bonds, or any reinvestment of the principal of the same that
may be hereafter made... reserving, however, for my own use
during my life the income and interest from said bonds and notes,
and restraining them from making any disposition of the principal of said bonds and notes during my life, and also reserving the
right to reinvest any money from the payment of these notes and
bonds as to me may seem fit."
The notes and bonds referred to were delivered to one of the donees,
for the benefit of all, with the explanation that he "would not have
any of the income, or anything of that sort, during [the donor's]
life." The interest on the bonds and notes was collected by the
donor or his agent until his death, and several of such notes matured
during his life, the proceeds of which were reinvested under direction
of himself or agent. The court held that such a disposition could
not be enforced as a gift since the right of control reserved by the
donor was inconsistent with absolute ownership of the donee. However, since it appeared that the donor intended to make a complete
disposition of the property, it constituted an executed express trust
which was not invalidated by the retention of income to the donor
and the power to direct reinvestment of the res.
The rules in connection with trusts may be analyzed and grouped
as follows: (x) If the trustor retains the income for life, but directs a
disposal after his death, a valid trust is created, and on the trustor's
8Cazallis v. Ingraham, supra note 19.
8'Libby v. Frost, 98 Me. 288, 56 Atl. 906 (1903); Cazallis v. Ingraham, supra
note I9.
84
Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, supra note 77; Woodling v. Bowman,
14 Me. 154 (1837); Cazallis v. Ingraham, supra note 19.
SsBorneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429 (1839); Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422 (1850);
Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48 (1858); Cazallis v. Ingraham, supra note i9; Clough
v. Clough, 117 Mass. 83 (1875); Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472 (1878).
BsCazallis v. Ingraham, supra note i9; Pierce v. Bank, 129 Mass. 425 (1880).
87
1n re Soulard's Estate, 141 Mo. 642, 651, 652, 43 S. W. 617, 618 (1897).
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death the property goes to the cestuis.5 9

This "does not admit of

doubt." 9 And a fortiori this is so, when part of the income goes to
the trustor and part to someone else,90 even though this requires part
of the principal, the discretion as to amount being left with trustee.91
The validity of the arrangement is unquestioned so far as the objec-

tions "to informal testamentary disposition are concerned.

(2)

If the

trustor reserves power to revoke or modify the trust so created, the
trust is almost universally held to be valid and the cestuis take. 2 The
most that has been said to the contrary by any American case is that
the reservation of the power of revocation is a strong element in
negativing an intent to abandon all control.9 3 The estate vests in
88Cramer v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., Ixo Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929), 73
A. L. R. 2oi (1931); Miles v. Miles, 78 Kan. 382, 96 Pac. 481 (19o8); Kelly v.
Parker, I81 IMl. 49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899); Norway Sav. Bank v. Merriam, supra
note 39; Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590 (1878); Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288,
70 N. E. 89 (19o4); Jones v. Old Colony Trust CO., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716
(1925); Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150 N. B. 866 (1926); In re Soulard's

Estate, supra note 87; Davis v. Rossi, 34 S. W. (2d) 8 (Mo. 1930); Union Trust
Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. I59, 167 N. E. 389 (1929); Dickerson's Appeal, IIS
Pa. St. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1887); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. St. 149, 21 Atl. 8o9 (1891);
Hall v. Hall, lo9 Va. 117, 6 3 S. E. 42o (I9O9). See (9Y1) 73 A. L. R. 209.
SCramer v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., supra note 88, at 28, 147 Atl. at 141.
90
Roberts v. Taylor, 30o Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924); McHenry v. McHenry,
152 Ga. IO5, IO8 S.E.522 (1921).
9"Harrod v. McComas, 78 Kan. 407, 96 Pac. 484 (19o8); Sands v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300 (1907); Lyle v. Burke, 4o Mich. 499

(1879); Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E. 464 (1885).
02President Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1896);
Nichols v. Emery, supra note 6; Cramer v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., supra
note 88; Norway Say. Bank v. Merriam, supra note 39; Stone v. Hackett, 72
Mass. 227 (1858); Kendrick v. Ray, 173 Mass. 305, 53 N. E.823 (1899); McEvoy
v. Boston 5c Savings Bank, supra note I2; Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co.;
Rochev. Brickley, both supranote 88; Wilcoxv. Hubbell, 197 Mich. 21,163 N. W.
497 (917); Hiserodt v. Hamlett, supra note 33; Sims v. Brown, supra note 6;
Witherington v. Herring, 14o N. C. 495, 53 S. E. 303 (19o6); McGillivray v. First
National Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 15o (1927); Nat. Newark etc. Banking

Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128 Atl. 586 (1925); Van Cott v. Prentice, IO4
N. Y. 45, ION. E. 257 (1887); Von Hesse v. Mackaye, 136 N. Y. 114, 32 N. E.
615 (1892); Robb v. Washington and Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N.
R. 359 (i9O6); Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, supra note 88; Allen v. Hendrick,
104 Ore. 202, 206 Pac. 733 (1922); Dickerson's Appeal, supra note 88; Lines v.
Lines, supra note 88; Winthrop v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634
(1914); In re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924); St. Albans v.
Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31 (1921); Richardson v. Stephenson, 193 Wis. 89,
213 N. W. 673 (1927); see Warsco v. Oshkosh Say. & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156,
196 N. W. 829 (1924). See (1931) 73 A. L. R. 209.
9
3Worthington's Admr. v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N. E.211 (1912).
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praesentisubject to defeasance in the manner indicated in the trust.94
The creation of a revocable trust vests in the beneficiary a present
estate in all respects valid until the power of revocation is exercised."
(3) If there is power to change the dispositions made by the instrument, this does not affect the validity of the trust.9
(4) If there is
97
power to appoint new trustees, the trust is valid and enforceable.
(5) If power is reserved to direct or approve investments or to direct
the trustee's management of the fund, or to require periodic accounts,
the trust is valid and enforceable.9" (6) Where possession of property
is retained, this does not invalidate the trust if the retention does not
otherwise prevent the passing of title to the trustee.9 9 (7) But where
the trustor reserves power to withdraw part or all the principal
without revoking the trust, the courts begin to divide. The majority
hold the trust valid and the principal goes to the named cestuis. 1 0
Consistent with the same views of the law detailed above, the following privileges have not invalidated the trust: trustee to turn back
property on demand;10' trustee holds property subject to "control
and demands" of trustor during his life.10 But in a few cases the
4Hiserodt v. Hamlett, supra note 33.
9'Corliss v. Bowers, 3o F. (2d) 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), citing Jones v. Clifton,
1OI U. S. 225 (1879); Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note 92; see Stone v. Hackett,
supra note 92.
96Kelley v. Snow; Roche v. Brickley, both supranote 88.
97 Keck v. McKinstry, 206 Iowa 1121, 221 N. W. 85i (1928).
9
8Bear v. Milliken Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349 (1929); Forney v.
Remey, 77 Iowa 549, 42 N. W. 439 (1889); Wilcox v. Hubbell, supra note 92; In
re Soulard's Estate, supra note 87; Davis v. Rossi, supra note 88; Van Cott v.
Prentice, supra note 92; Winthrop v. Girard Trust Co., supra note 92; St. Albans
v. Avery, supra note 92; Pietsch v. Marshall, etc., Bank, 164 Wis. 368,16o N. W.
184 (i916).
99
Kelley v. Snow, supra note 88; Spangler v. Vermillion, 8o W. Va. 75, 92 S. B.
449 (1917); cf. Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98, 39 N. E. 698 (1895); Talbot v.
Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, 78 Atl. 535 (191).

10OHeUman v. McWilliams, 70 Cal. 449, iI Pac. 659 (1886) (retention of powers
held to indicate intention of retaining life estate only); Booth v. Oakland Bank
of Savings, supra note 77; Lovett v. Farnham, 169 Mass. i, 47 N. B. 246 (1897)
(sums necessary for support); Davis v. Ney, supra note 88 (power treated similarly to power of revocation); Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 88;
Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, supra note 88 (this was based on assumed purpose
of the Ohio amending statute; the court opposed the idea otherwise); Wade
v. Button, 72 Vt. 136, 47 Atl. 4o6 (i9oo) (beneficiaries to take only such property
as the trustor did "not live to use up").
1
°lRosenberg v. Rosenberg, 4o Hun 91, (N. Y. 1886). Contra: Russell v.
Webster, supra note 12.
102Von Hesse v. Mackaye, supra note 92. Contra:Rudd v. Rudd, I84 Yy.400,
214 S.W. 791 (1919).
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court reached the opposite conclusion and held the disposition
testamentary and invalid.'0
Ai
It is not necessary to determine whether the control over the fund
reserved by the owner is to be regarded as a power of revocation of
the trust, or whether the whole transaction is to be regarded as a trust
in her favor of so much of the fund as she might see proper to withdraw in her lifetime and of the remainder for her sisters. In either
case the practical result is the same, for a power of revocation as to the
whole may be exercised as to a part, and when so exercised does not
affect the remainder. 0 4 In Jones v. The Old Colony Trust Company,
the Massachusetts court' pointed the way to a valid trust; namely,
possession by trustee of definite management powers, of investment,
determination of principal and income, etc.
When the retention of the life interest is coupled with the reservation of a power of revocation the line of demarcation between the
testamentary disposition and the inter-vivos transfer becomes less
distinct. While the combination is generally held to be consistent
with a present trust,0 8 these trusts assume a quasi-testamentary
aspect.107 In these instances the settlor is retaining the benefits of
his property during his life, and at the same time is rendering his
transfer of the beneficial interest by way of remainder ambulatory.
To be sure, he is not free to dispose of it without first exercising the
power of revocation. The beneficiary has a present right to the
remainder until divested by the condition subsequent of the exercise
of the power. Practically it might be seriously doubted whether he
has more than a robust expectancy. The situation is at least on the
border-line. 08
10Demartini v. Allegretti, 146 Cal. 214, 79 Pac. 871 (1905); McEvoy v. Boston
5c Savings Bank, supra note 12. In the above cases the parties admitted that
the purpose of the transaction was to avoid probate proceedings. Warsco v.
Oshkosh Say. & Trust Co., supra note 92 (the trust was not revocable; changed
by statute, Wis. Laws 1931, § 23r, 205. Followed in Darling v. Mattoon State.
Bank, r89 Wis. 117, 207 N. W. 254 (1926).
184Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, supra note 77.
'OrSupra note 88.
0
'1
See Barlow v. Loomis, 19 Fed. 677 (C. C. D. Vt. 1884); Nichols v. Emery,
supra note 6; Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915); Nat.
Newark, etc., Bank v. Rosahl, supra note 92.
107See i PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 97.
108Another phase of the problem is presented in transfers in consideration of
agreements to support the grantor and to pay specified sums to third parties.
Vermont holds that an irrevocable trust for the third parties is created. Saergent v.
Baldwin, 6o Vt. 17, 13 Atl. 854 (1877); and see Barber v. Thompson, 49 Vt. 213
(1876). New Hampshire considers the transaction testamentary and not a trust.
Fellows v. Fellows, 69 N. H. 339, 46 Atl. 474 (1898).
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It is difficult to see how a trustor can reserve power to revoke the
trust without affecting its validity, while a reserved right to take part
of the principal defeats the transaction, for it would seem that the
greater should include the less. In the related field of federal inheritance taxation, the trustor's ability to revoke the trust is now regarded as sufficient to make the disposition testamentary; more recently
the right to enjoy income appears to have a similar effect.109 The
distinction probably lies in different doctrines of property law. The
power to change the beneficiary of a policy is the power to appoint." 0
A power of revocation of a trust is not a power of appointment, but is
a power the exercise of which is a condition precedent to the exercise
of the power of appointment."' The law recognizes that one may be
owner of property even though another has a power of appointment
in regard to it. So, too, reservation of power to revoke, even though
the trustor is a mere beneficiary for life, is not considered inconsistent
with a presently vested interest in other beneficiaries. The right of
revocation, standing alone, is not tantamount to a property right
2
in the settlor; it possesses none of the attributes of property."
Power of revocation and power to direct division of property are not
estates." 3 A withdrawal of principal under right reserved is indeed a
part of the performance of the trust, not a revocation of it.1 4 The
cases so hold. Where an instrument of trust provided that there
should be paid to the cestui "such portion of the principal as she in
her judgment may deem necessary for her comfort and support,"
it was decided that this was not a power of revocation but an agreement for the performance of a trust in a way declared by the instrument itself, the court saying:"' "If he pays over to her the whole
principal upon its being deemed necessary by her for her comfort and
support, she has not revoked the trust, but has required its performIORowley, op. cit. supra note ia,at 390.
"'Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915);
Reid v. Durboraw, 272 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921); Maryland Mut. Ben. Society
v. Clendiven, 44 Md. 429 (1876); Modern Woodmen v. Headle, 88 Vt. 37, 9o Atl.
893 (i914), L.R.A. i 9 15A 580; see i SUGDEN, POWERS (3dAm. ed. 1856) *440 etseg.
mOld Colony Trust Co. v. Gardner, 264 Mass. 68, I6I N. E. 8oi (1928), citing
In re Thursby's Settlement, [1910] 2 Ch.Div. 181; see In re Brace, [1891] 2 Ch.
Div. 671; Knocker v. Jones, [1920] I Ch.Div. 527.
raIn re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924); Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
MBear v. Milliken Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, I68 N. E. 349 (1930).
"'Keck v. McKinstry, supra note 97; Allen v. Hendrick; Warsco v. Oshkosh
Say. & Trust Co., both supra note 92.
MLovett v. Farnham, supra note ioo, at 2. And see Cramer v. HartfordConn. Trust Co., supra note 88.
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ance, and the trustee has executed it, and the instrument, having
performed its office, no longer controls the disposition of the property."
It has been claimed that the trust comes to an end with the period
of retention and the disposition of its principal is testamentary. In
the Hawkins case 18 there was provision that the trust was to "terminate" at the death of the settlor. As the court there stated:
"In the instant case the duty owing by the trust company to
the children was not one of care and management. On the
contrary, the moment any obligation arose on the part of the
bank to the children, viz., at the death of Mrs. Hawkins, it became the duty to immediately pay the money to the children.
The trust features of the agreement having ended, the right of
the trust company to make distribution to the children necessarily depends upon the question whether a present interest was
conveyed to the favored children by the supplementary agreement."
It is submitted that such a close interpretation is hardly warranted.
The care and management duties do come to an end. But the principal cannot remain in the trustee's hands or become its property. The
distribution of the fund may be more or less ministerial, but it is a
duty imposed by the settlor nevertheless, and enforceable as such.
At least three cases" 7 have held squarely that the disposition of the
principal or termination of the trust is a part of the trust function.
One of these" 8 arrives at this result by the theory of two trusts, the
second not to take effect in possession and enjoyment until the death
of the settlor.
There seems to be no great distinction between a provision that the
trustee hold as such after settlor's death, a stipulation that the trust
is to "terminate" and the trustee is to make distribution, and a simple
statement that the trustee is to distribute the res without provision
for termination."9
A study of the cases creates the impression that courts have been
influenced by the feeling that one is evading or circumventing the
wills statute and doing something wrong and against public policy
if he makes a final settlement of his affairs other than by will. This
attitude has made the court alert in picking flaws in other arrangen"Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, supra note 88.
n 7 Cramer v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., supra note 88; Miles v. Miles, 78
INan. 382, 96 Pac. 481 (19o8); Wilcox v. Hubbell, supra note 92. Contra: Warsco
v.Oshkosh
Savings and Trust Co., supra note 92.
n 8Wilcox v. Hubbell, supra note 92.
n9Rowley, op. cit. supra note Ia at 372.
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ments. A conveyance of land reserving a life interest with remainder
over is perfectly proper though the grantor has by that conveyance
disposed of his property after death and intends it to take the place
of a will. In Perry v. Cross12 0 it was necessary to "evade" the statute
of wills as the settlor had power under a will to dispose of property
which power she could not exercise by will.
Justice Holmes well expressed the principle which should govern,
however, when he said:
"We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a
line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side
is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the
full of what the law permits. When an act is condemned as an
evasion what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the 2line
indicated by the policy if not by the mere letter of the law.' '
The practical safeguard against the use of trusts to circumvent
the statute of wills lies in the necessity that under them the settlor
must largely divest himself of the control and management of his
property.
An interesting supposition and conclusion was made in a Kentucky
case :123
"Suppose A. gives a sum of money to a trustee to be loaned for
five years, with direction to pay principal and interest to B. if A.
died within that period, but in the event of his surviving that
period, to pay it to C., can it be doubted that a valid trust is
created, and that both B. and C. take a present interest in the
fund, though necessarily the actual enjoyment of the fund will
vest in but one of them; the consummation of each right depending upon the contingency of A. dying within, or surviving, the life
of the plan? The same principle would apply if A. directed the
fund paid to C. at the end of the period, but reserved and exercised the right to appoint a person to take if he (A.) died in the
meantime, which is entirely similar to this case. Thus construed, the plan created a trust, with power reserved in the settlor to appoint additional beneficiaries, ..
To make this an exact description of the election of a deferred settlement by the beneficiary of a policy, all that is needed is to change a
half dozen words making the first line read, "Suppose A leaves the
proceeds of a matured insurance policy with the company to be
loaned," etc.
The new devices for keeping insurance protection from being dissi454.
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630, 631, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 474 (igi6).
=Cramer v. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., supranote 88.
wsSiter v. HaUl, 220 Ky. 43, 50, 294 S. W. 767, 771 (1927).
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pated as cash in the hands of persons unused to handling cash in large
sums are too useful, in every social sense, to be made the subject of
judicial hostility.
SUMMARY

As the authorities stand, the test is the time when an interest pases. If the donee has a present title or interest, it is sufficient though
enjoyment of the thing transferred be postponed. On the other hand,
if the instrument is to have no effect until the donor's death, it is
testamentary and revoked by the donor's death. In determining
this the donor's intent is the controlling factor. In ascertaining his
intent, the important elements are whether the donor has retained:
(i) Payment of income for specified period or life; (2) Right to revoke
the settlement and designate a new beneficiary of the principal or
unused part; and (3) Right to withdraw part or all the principal.
It may be said with considerable certainty that possession of the
first two does not indicate testamentary character, and settlements
which reserve no greater rights than these or similar will be carried
out.
It is with respect to the third heading, when there is power to
diminish the amount which passes over, that uncertainty begins. In
legal gifts, and to some extent in gifts in trust, there is almost hopeless confusion due to the circumstances in connection with the
delivery and notice to the donee. In trusts this matter of notice is of
lesser importance or is presumed. One authority2 says that it is
entirely a matter of policy where the line shall be drawn between
testamentary and non-testamentary dispositions; that the problem
is an economic one and there is a tendency to sustain them when that
result is desirable.
The most that one can say is that the beneficiary or assignee of a
policy payable to him or her in one sum, or an insured at endowment
maturity or on surrender of the policy, may elect a deferred settlement and direct that the principal or unused portion go on his death
to designated payees, and this result probably will not be prevented
by the fact that he receives the income and has power to designate a
new payee of the principal. Also, it is possible that the plan will be
upheld even if right exists to reduce the benefit to later payees by
withdrawal, etc., on the theory either of trust (which is preferred by
the writer) or of contract. However, the doubt, especially when the
last listed option exists, is so great that attorneys may well advise
beneficiaries to omit such reservation and insurance companies may
well decline to include the withdrawal privilege.
'PRowley,

op. cit. supra note Ia, at 403.

